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Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy Effectiveness: Empirical 
Evidence from Nigeria 
 
Abstract: The study examines the impact of central bank communication on monetary policy in 
Nigeria by applying the standard deviation measure of volatility and the vector autoregressive 
approach. The findings show that inflation and markets volatilities reduced during the period of 
improved central bank communication. The money market responded positively to central bank 
communication and reverted faster to equilibrium compared with the stock market which 
responded negatively and reverted slower to equilibrium. Central bank communication is also 
able to explain some variation in the money and stock markets. The policy implications of the 
findings include the need for the Central Bank of Nigeria to continue to improve on its 
communications strategy as this has helped reduce inflation and markets volatility. In addition, 
the interest rate channel of the transmission mechanism should be accorder greater priority 
compared to the asset channel as the money market reverted faster to equilibrium compared to 
the stock market in the event of a shock.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The way central banks communicate to the public determines the level of transparency and 
credibility of monetary policy. One very important aspect of central bank communication is that 
it ‘creates news and raises the signal-to-noise ratio by eliminating guessing on the part of the 
public’ (Sanusi, 2011). Moreover, communication clarifies public concerns about the instruments 
and goals of monetary policy. This way the underlying reasons behind the decisions made by the 
monetary authorities are better understood (Winkers, 2000). Also, communication enhances the 
predictability of monetary policy decisions and by extension its transparency. Given that 
transparency is defined as ‘the absence of asymmetric information between policy makers and 
the public’, the expectation is that markets should be able to anticipate monetary policy decisions 
reasonably well. Hence, it remains unarguable that in the event of poor communication by the 
central bank, market volatility may become more pronounced.  
 
In line with global best practices, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in recent years has moved 
towards greater policy transparency and credibility by improving the way it communicates with 
the public. Despite this noticeable improvement, there is still very little or no empirical evidence 
on the link between central bank communication and monetary policy outcomes in Nigeria. 
Therefore, investigating the communication strategy of the CBN and providing some insights 
into how this has influenced monetary policy is of essence. This is the key contribution of this 
paper to the literature. The approach for this study is a combination of both descriptive and 
empirical techniques in order to achieve a number of objectives. The broad objective is to 
evaluate the CBN’s communication strategy while the specific one is to examine the interaction 
between the communication strategy and monetary policy variables.  
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We review the literature on central bank communication in section 2 while section 3 provides a 
discussion on CBN’s communications strategy. The subsequent Section 4 offers a snapshot of 
monetary policy since 2004 – the year the CBN began issuing its monetary policy communiqué 
publicly. Section 5 presents the methodology and section 6 presents the data and the empirical 
results. Section 7 provides the policy implications of the findings. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
The literature on central bank communication and how it affects monetary policy is still 
emerging. The consensus in the literature is that communication boosts the transparency of 
policy and ultimately improves economic efficiency.  
 
 
The study by Guthrie and Wright (2000) found that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand used its 
communication in an organized and highly effectual way for controlling short-term rates. Kohn 
and Sack (2003) were able to explain that statements by the United States Federal Reserve 
Chairman about the monetary policy have a significant effect on the volatility of short-term 
interest rates. The work of Demiralp and Jorda (2003) also provide that public pronouncements 
by the Federal Reserve moved short-term interest rates rather than the much-perceived liquidity 
channel of open market operations. Bernanke et al. (2004) find that the financial markets in the 
United States point significant importance to announcements that include an indication about the 
future path of policy. 
 
 
In a study meant to show how the Bank of England’s communication affected markets, Haldane 
and Read (2000) offer proof that the effect of monetary policy decisions on short-term interest 
rates had reduced over the years, an indication that information asymmetries about the economy 
have been reduced. Andersson et al. (2001) conducted a study for the Swedish Riksbank and 
found that the Bank’s communication played an important role in influencing financial markets. 
Similarly, Siklos and Bohl (2003) conducted a study for the Bundesbank and found that 
communication was able to explain a significant variation in the financial markets. All these 
clearly supports the view that central banks’ communication influences the workings of financial 
markets in a significant manner.   
 
The effects of communication have also been studied with respect to how they affect key 
economic indicators. For example, the work of Jansen and de Haan (2004a) for the European 
Central Bank (ECB) as well as that of Fratzscher (2004) for the G3 monetary authorities 
analyzed the effect of communication on exchange rates. While the former found some effect on 
the volatility of the euro, the latter obtained more systematic evidence in favour of effectiveness 
for all G3 central banks in changing the level and volatility of exchange rates in the desired 
direction. With other words, the results on the volatility impact of central bank communication 
are mixed.  
 
The literature on central bank communication and monetary policy is still developing in Nigeria 
as in the wider literature. Most empirical studies on monetary policy for Nigeria have dwelled on 
other topical issues like monetary policy effectiveness and fiscal policy, monetary policy and 
economic growth, monetary policy and stock market performance among others. However, a few 
pioneering studies on the current subject matter have been carried out.  One of such is Sanusi 
(2012) who looked at the signaling effects of monetary policy using evidence from the new 
central bank of Nigeria’s communication regime. Using daily data for the period 2005-2011 to 
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estimate the effects of monetary policy signals on the Nigeria Interbank Offer Rates, the study 
found that rates are significantly more volatile in weeks coinciding with monetary policy 
committee meetings. The study therefore posited that central bank communication is potentially 
a viable tool for monetary policy implementation in Nigeria. Also, Salisu (2012) assessed the 
impact of communication by the CBN on stock prices in the Nigerian stock market. Applying 
Exponential Generalized Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (EGARCH) model, the 
study found that communication impacted significantly on stock prices and reduced volatility in 
the stock market. However, neither of these studies explicitly relates central bank communication 
with monetary policy outcomes. Specifically, we critically examine the speeches of some CBN 
governors and attempt to relate this to the behaviour of selected monetary aggregates. 
Furthermore, the impulse response and variance decomposition analyses conducted in the present 
paper are not covered in earlier studies. 
 
Following from the review of the literature, it is important that an overview of the 
communication strategy of the CBN be provided. This is the focus of the next section.    
 
3. Overview of the communication strategy of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
Table 1 shows the communication strategy of the CBN with those of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of the US, the Bank of England (BOE) and the European Central Bank (ECB). During the 
monetary policy committee meetings, the CBN governor who is also the chairman of the 
committee usually speaks last after other members have presented their views. This follows the 
pattern of the BOE and ECB, where the chairmen also speak last. The FED’s strategy is different 
in this regard as the chairman takes the lead in presenting his policy proposal. The CBN, like the 
three comparator central banks, provides press release after interest rate decisions have been 
made. This usually takes the form of a ‘Policy Communiqué. According to Sanusi (2012) ‘the 
content of the press-statement includes mainly the decisions reached and the basis for such 
decisions and this helps reduce noise that a policy announcement may generate.’ Apart from 
publishing the communiqué on its website, the CBN also publish the communiqué in selected 
newspapers with wide coverage.1 This strategy may be aimed at further expanding the reach and 
publicity of its interest rate decision since internet penetration in Nigeria is still relatively low 
(estimated at only 28 users per 100 people by the World Bank in 2011).  
Table 1: Communications Strategy of the key Central Banks 
 
Strategy FED BOE ECB CBN 
Modus operandi during 
 Meeting 
Chairman 
speaks first  
Chairman 
speaks last.  
Chairman 
speaks last.  
Chairman 
speaks last 
Press release after interest rate decision Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Press conference & question/answer  No No Yes Yes 
Minutes of meeting Yes Yes No Yes 
Video of meeting Yes Yes No Yes 
Publish information on voting pattern Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional sources of information  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  
Publish Governor’s speeches/presentations Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Publish members speeches/presentations Yes Yes Yes No 
  Source: Author’s Compilation 
 
                                                 
1 See for example ThisDay Newspaper 12 June 2013, pages 44J – 46 and BusinessDay Newspaper 12 June 2013, pages A4 – A8 
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The CBN in line with the ECB’s strategy holds a press conference after its interest rate decision 
meeting which also involves a question and answer session to explain the rationale for its 
decisions. This press conference involves the invitation of the media, both print and electronic, 
as well as other stakeholders. The possible rationale for this is to provide the formal platform for 
clarifying grey areas with respect to the interest rate decision. Such clarifications are also 
expected to be properly disseminated by the invited media practitioners who then take on the 
consequent duty of providing the public with further insight into why certain decisions were 
taken by the monetary policy committee. With respect to providing information on the voting 
pattern of the monetary policy committee members, the CBN has been doing this since January 
2011, and this follows the strategy of the FED, BOE and the ECB.   
The CBN provides additional information concerning monetary policy beyond those provided 
through the press release and the press conference, for example, through briefing of the national 
assembly as provided by the law. The BOE provides quarterly inflation report and press 
conference to provide further explanations on its decisions. The FED provides the Congress with 
a semi-annual report on monetary policy issues as well as a summary of decision plus balance-
of-risks assessment over the foreseeable horizon. While the CBN publishes the speeches and 
presentations of the governor on its website, it does not provide such information for other 
members of the monetary policy committee, contrary to the strategy of the FED, BOE and the 
ECB.  
While it is true that most of the monetary policy committee members give occasional speeches 
and presentations, the non-publication of these by the CBN on its website makes the members 
less visible and known to the public. For instance, apart from the interview by the Deputy 
Governor in charge of banking regulation, Tunde Lemo, on 19 September 2012, the CBN only 
publishes the speeches and presentations of the governor.  
Taking a cue from Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), the speeches and presentations of the CBN 
governor and chairman of the monetary policy committee, Mallam Sanusi L. Sanusi, are 
classified into monetary policy related, economy related and ‘others’. This classification is then 
compared with those of the predecessors Professor Chukwuma C. Soludo who was the CBN 
governor between May 31st 2004 and May 2009 and Mr. Joseph Sanusi who was head of the 
apex bank between May 30th 1999 and May 30th 2004 (For details on all these speeches see 
Tables 1-3 in Appendix A). Monetary policy related speeches and presentations are those that 
focus mainly on monetary policy matters and operations as well as those specific to exchange 
rate, interest rate and inflation. On the contrary, the speeches and presentations that are economy 
related are those that dwell on economic growth and development, poverty reduction, small and 
medium scale businesses, etc., while ‘Others’ are those that are neither monetary policy or 
economy related. The rationale for this classification is that the markets tend to gauge monetary 
policy sentiment if more of the speeches and presentations are monetary policy related.  
Table 2 and Figure 1 show that Mallam Sanusi L. Sanusi had made a total of 16 speeches and 
presentations as at 31 May 2013 with none classified as monetary policy related. Specifically, 
while 15 or 93.7% are economy related only 1 or 6.2% is categorised as ‘others’. For professor 
Soludo who delivered a total of 47 speeches and presentations during his 5-year leadership in the 
CBN, 11 or 23.4% are monetary policy related while 35 or 74.5% are economy related and only 
5 
 
one or 2.1% classified as ‘others’. Mr. Joseph Sanusi had a total of 81 speeches with 15 or 18.5% 
classified as monetary policy related while 29 or 35.8% are economy related and 37 or 45.7% 
classified as ‘others’.   
Table 2: Classification of speeches by CBN Governors  
 
 
Governor 
Total speeches/ 
presentations 
Speeches related to 
monetary policy 
Speeches related 
to economy 
Others 
Joseph Sanusi 81 15  29  37  
Chukwuma Soludo 47 11 35  1  
Sanusi.L. Sanusi 16 0  15     1  
            Source: Compiled from CBN Website 
 
Figure 1: Classification of speeches by CBN Governors   
     
 
Joseph Sanusi Chukwuma Soludo Sanusi .L. Sanusi
Monetary Policy Related 18.5% 23.4% 0.0%
Economy Related 35.8% 74.5% 93.8%
Others 45.7% 2.1% 6.2%
0.0%
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40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
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90.0%
100.0%
 
       Source: Author’s Classifications 
Although Mallam Sanusi L. Sanusi is yet to complete his 5-year tenure as the CBN governor, 
comparing his speeches with those of Professor Soludo and Mr. Joseph Sanusi is still instructive. 
This is because in the first four years in office, which is between June 2009 and May 2013, he 
produced a total of 16 speeches with most of them being economy- related. Therefore, there is 
the likelihood that this trend might not change significantly in the fifth and final year.  In other 
words, the ratio of Mallam Sanusi’s speeches that can be categorized as monetary policy related 
is likely to fall short of those of his immediate predecessors. 
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4. Review of monetary policy since 2004  
Since this study aims to ascertain how CBN communication has affected monetary policy, the 
review commences from 2004 because that is the year the CBN started releasing its monetary 
policy communiqué. Figure 2 shows that in 2004, the CBN held 10 meetings on monetary policy 
with the main policy instrument being the withdrawal of public sector funds from commercial 
banks. However, the use of interest rate instrument, then known as the Minimum Rediscount 
Rate (MRR), saw the CBN increasing the benchmark rate four times while leaving it unchanged 
six times. In 2005 the interest rate committee met only three times and the withdrawal of public 
sector funds remained a key policy instrument while the MRR was left unchanged twice and was 
reduced once. Other instruments used include the exchange rate band as well as the cash reserve 
ratio (CRR). By year 2006, the use of public sector funds withdrawal as a policy instrument was 
reduced and the MRR was increased once and left unchanged twice.   
Figure 2: Breakdown of monetary policy decisions between 2004 and 2013 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Tightening 4 0 1 1 2 0 1 6 0 0 15
Easing 0 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 7
Maintained 6 2 2 1 3 6 6 1 6 3 36
 
      Source: Compiled from CBN monetary policy communiqués 
Due to the less than impressive performance of the MRR as the main policy instrument, the CBN 
on 4th December 2006 introduced the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR). The MPR unlike the MRR 
was meant to determine the lower and upper bands of the CBN’s standing loan facility to banks 
and discount houses as well as act as the nominal anchor for other rates. With the change in 
monetary policy framework late in 2006, the expectation was for an improved monetary policy 
performance in 2007. To this end, the committee on interest rate met five times that year and 
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increased the MPR once, retained it once and reduced it twice.2 In 2008 a total of six meetings 
were held including a special meeting due to the general effects of the global economic crisis on 
the economy (See Figure 2). Specifically, while the MPR was left unchanged during the first 
meeting in the year, it was increased in the second and third meetings and then left unchanged in 
the fourth meeting before it was reduced in the special meeting on 18th September 2008. In the 
last meeting for 2008, the MPR was left unchanged at 9.75%.   
In 2009, a total of seven meetings were held by the interest rate committee with no 
contractionary decision as the MPR was reduced once and left unchanged six times. Other policy 
instruments applied that year include, but not limited to, the normal open market operations, 
reintroduction of the Retail Dutch Auction System (RDAS), moral suasion and quantitative 
easing due to the effects of the global economic crisis. The trend continued in 2010 as the MPR 
was increased only once while it was left unchanged six times. The main departure from 
previous years was the publishing of attendance of the interest rate committee in the September 
2010 meeting. By 2011 the move towards greater transparency in monetary policy was taken as 
the CBN started publishing the members’ statements and voting patterns (except in July 2011) 
during interest rate meetings. The MPR was increased six times in 2011 and left unchanged only 
once while other policy instruments were used to complement the MPR. The contrary was, 
however, the case in 2012 as the MPR was left unchanged throughout the year while members’ 
statements and voting pattern were published. This trend did not change in 2013 as the first three 
meetings in the year had the MPR left unchanged while the members’ statements and voting 
patterns were provided.  
In summary, between October 2004 and May 2013, the CBN has increased interest rate 15 times, 
cut rates seven times and left the rate unchanged 36 times. The implication of this is that the 
CBN has kept to its primary mandate of ensuring price stability as against an expansionary mode 
which would have been more in support of growth. 
5. Methodology  
 
5.1 Descriptive technique    
Since one of the means of communicating with the public is through publishing of speeches and 
presentations of the CBN governors, in line with the consensus view in the wider literature that 
markets react significantly to statements by central bank heads, the study ascertains how the 
markets in Nigeria have performed in the regimes of the different CBN governors. Specifically, 
the study finds out markets volatility, measured by the standard deviation, behaved under these 
regimes.   
5.2 Empirical technique    
 
The estimation technique for this study follows the multivariate VAR cointegration approach 
developed by Johansen (1988; 1991) and further extended by Johansen-Juselius (1990; 1992). 
The approach is based on the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation method, and has been used 
widely in the monetary policy literature. In this technique, all the variables in the model are 
assumed to be endogenous.  
                                                 
2 The communiqué number 52 was unavailable for download.  
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If we consider a VAR with p lags in the form below; 
                                 
tptpttt yAyAyAvy   ...2211
                                    (1)   
                                                                                                                                               
where t
y
 is a K × 1 vector of endogenous variables, v  is K × 1 vector of parameters, p
AA 1  
are K × K matrices of parameters, and t

 is K × 1 vector of disturbance terms. This VAR can be 
re-specified as a vector error correction (VEC) model as: 
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As shown by Engle and Granger (1987), if the variables t
y
  are first-difference stationary - I(1),  
the matrix   in  (2) has a rank 0 ≤ r < K, where r is the number of linearly independent 
cointegrating vectors and K is the number of included variables (potential endogenous variables). 
With a reduced rank 0 < r < K,   can be expressed as   so that (2) is represented as: 
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                                 (3) 
Where  and   are both K × r matrices of rank r. Two tests, the trace test and the maximum-
eigenvalue test are usually used in determining the number of linearly independent co-integrating 
vectors.   
 
The specification of interest is as follows:   
                                       ),,( ttt COMMASIMRRMPRNIBOR                            (4) 
Where NIBOR is the 30-day Nigerian Interbank Offer Rate and the choice of this variable 
follows the fact that it is an important variable being influenced by monetary policy decisions.  
MRRMPR is the official interest rate, ASI is the stock market all share index and COMM is 
communication which is captured using a dummy.  Specifically, the period when the CBN was 
not releasing its policy communiqués is captured as 0 while the period when the communiqués 
were being released is denoted by 1. The variables NIBOR, MRRMPR and the ASI are taken 
from various issues of Central Bank of Nigeria statistical bulletin and annual reports.  
Theoretically, it is expected that these variables will interact through the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. First, the money market rate, proxied by the NIBOR, is expected 
to mirror the official interest rate because the central bank in attempting to push through its 
policy goal sees the banking sector as one of the transmission channels. Therefore, an 
expansionary policy stance is expected to affect the NIBOR rate positively, thereby increasing 
liquidity in the system, and vice-versa. Also, the money market and the stock market, proxied by 
the ASI, react to central bank interest rate decision with varying degree. For example, in an 
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expansionary mode, the markets are expected to benefit from such liquidity increase. However, 
based on investors’ preferences, the markets may experience varying degree of investments. 
Also, the way the central bank communicates its policy decisions is very important as both the 
money and stock market players, if they truly understand what the central bank is doing, may 
have already factored in the expected policy decision in their transactions, thereby reducing 
volatility in market rates.   
The Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) is used test to ascertain the time series properties of the 
variables. Following the ADF test is the selection of the appropriate lag length using the Akaike 
Information Criterion [AIC], the Bayesian Information Criterion [BIC] and the Schwarz 
information criterion [SIC]. Once the appropriate lag order is determined, the co-integration test 
is conducted so that the cointegrating vectors are identified.  
 
Following from the above, the focus while estimating equation (4) is to be able to conduct the 
impulse response function to trace out the interaction of the variables in the model while the 
variance decomposition technique is applied to explain the extent to which each variable in the 
model explains the variation in other variables.  
 
5.3 Data source and time frame  
 
The study uses quarterly data from 1985q1 to 2013q2 and sourced primarily from the central 
bank of Nigeria. To ascertain the volatility in inflation and the money and stock markets, the 
analysis is conducted for the different regimes of the present and past CBN governors while the 
overall impact of communications is examined between 1985q1 to 2013q2 using the impulse 
response and variance decomposition techniques.  
 
 
6. Results  
 
6.1 Volatilities in inflation and markets under the different CBN governors  
 
Looking at the volatility of inflation under the different CBN governors, Figure 1 in Appendix B 
depicts that the volatility in inflation was highest between 1985 and 1999 prior to the 
appointment of Joseph Sanusi as governor, with a standard deviation of 25.52. While the 
volatility reduced during the era of Joseph Sanusi with the standard deviation dropping to 6.96, 
this figure is higher when compared with the era of Professor Chukwuma Soludo when the 
standard deviation dropped to 5.46 and then to the present dispensation of Sanusi Lamido Sanusi 
with the standard deviation dropping further to 1.7176. The implication of the above is that 
monetary policy effectiveness as it concerns the curbing of inflation has improved over time. 
Partly responsible for this may be the improved communication and transparency which has 
helped improve inflation expectations.  
 
When the volatility of the money market is examined, Figure 2 in Appendix B shows that the 
period of Sanusi Lamido Sanusi has been the most volatile while it was least during the period of 
Professor Chukwuma Soludo. This may not be particularly surprising since Professor Soludo 
during his era was talking more about monetary policy related issues (see Figure 1), implying 
that the market is able to gauge fairly reasonably monetary policy sentiment. Of all the speeches 
and presentations given by Mallam Sanusi L. Sanusi, none is classified as monetary policy 
related (see Table 1 in Appendix A). Another possible reason for the high volatility of the money 
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market during the period of Sanusi Lamido Sanusi may be the insistent measures taken to clean 
up the banking system. The coming on board of Sanusi Lamido Sanusi as the CBN governor in 
2009 brought about more stringent measures in the banking sector, resulting in reduced margin 
loans and consequently lower volatility in the stock market as shown in Figure 3 in Appendix B.  
6.2 Empirical results   
6.2.1 Unit root test, Lag selection and Johansen cointegrating test 
The unit root test results in Table 1 of Appendix B show that the MRRMPR and NIBOR are 
stationary at level while ASI has unit root at level but became stationary after first differencing. 
Also, the variables were transformed into their natural logarithms. Table 2 of Appendix B shows 
the lag length selection using the Akaike criterion (AIC), the Schwarz Bayesian criterion (BIC) 
and the Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQC). These criteria indicate that the appropriate lag length for 
the model is one although these criteria have distinct penalty factors. To test if there are 
cointegrating vectors in the equation, the results of the Johansen cointegrating tests are shown in 
Table 3 of Appendix B using the Eigenvalue and trace tests. The results indicate that there is 
evidence of three cointegrating vectors in the equation.   
6.2.2 The impulse-response analysis    
 
The impulse-response analysis is used to ascertain how each of the variables responds to one 
standard error shock to another variable. Figure 1 in Appendix C shows that the response of the 
NIBOR to a one standard error shock to the MRRMPR is positive but declines until it the effect 
dies out from the 5th quarter. The response of the NIBOR to a shock to communication as shown 
in Figure 2 in Appendix C indicates that the reaction was initially zero at Q1, but rose 
consistently before getting flat at Q4 and remained so throughout the entire duration of the 
period. This flat but positive response from Q4 is an indication of the importance of 
communication. This result supports the findings of Guthrie and Wright (2000) that the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand used its communication in an organized and highly effectual way for 
controlling short-term rates.  
   
The response of the stock market all share index (ASI) to a shock to the MRRMPR is shown in 
Figure 3 in Appendix C. Specifically, the response of the ASI to a one standard error shock to the 
official interest rate is negative from Q1 and the negative rise continued before becoming flat 
and remaining negative from Q6.  With respect to the response of the ASI to a one standard error 
shock to communication, Figure 4 in Appendix C shows that the response was negative from Q1 
and remained so until the negative effect became constant from Q7.   
 
6.2.3 The variance decomposition analysis  
 
Another set of results to discuss are the findings of the variance decomposition analysis. Table 1 
in Appendix C shows that approximately 87% of the variation in the official interest rate is 
explained by its own shock, followed by the stock market ASI and then by communication. 
NIBOR explains the least variance in the official interest rate.  From Table 2 in Appendix C, 
approximately 75% of the variance in the NIBOR is explained by its own shock, followed by the 
official interest rate and then by communication. The stock market ASI explains the least 
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variance in the NIBOR. The fact that the official interest rate is able to explain the second largest 
variation in the NIBOR implies that over the period studied, monetary policy may have been 
relatively successful through the interest rate channel of the transmission mechanism. This 
finding is in line with the results of Siklos and Bohl (2003) who found that communication was 
able to explain a significant variation in the financial markets in Germany.   
 
 
With respect to the variation in the stock market ASI, Table 3 in Appendix C shows that while 
communication explains the least variation in the ASI, the greater variance of 96% is explained 
by own shock, followed by the official interest rate and then the NIBOR. This result, however, 
does not support the finding of Salisu (2012) that communication had significant impact on stock 
prices and reduced volatility in the stock market.  Table 4 in Appendix C shows that the bulk of 
the variance in the central bank communication is explained by its own shock (i.e about 99%) 
followed by the official interest rate (1.1%) while NIBOR and ASI explained less than 1%.   
 
7. Summary of findings and policy implications    
 
The study attempted to examine the impact of communication on monetary policy in Nigeria 
applying the standard deviation measure of volatility and the vector autoregressive approach. 
The main findings include (1) inflation and markets volatility reduced significantly in the period 
of improved CBN communication in line with global best practices. However, money market 
volatility was highest in the period of Mallam Sanusi and one reason may be due to the zero 
tolerance for unethical practices in the financial system (2) money market responded positively 
to central bank communication until the effect became permanent after Q4 (3) the stock market 
responded negatively to central bank communication until the negative effect became permanent 
from Q7 (4) the greater variance in official interest rate is explained by its own shock, followed 
by the stock market and then communication while money market explained the least variance in 
the official interest rate (5) the greater variance in the NIBOR is explained by own shock, 
followed by official interest rate and then communication while the stock market explained the 
least variance in the money market (6) central bank communication explained the least variance 
in the stock market while the greater variance in the market is explained by own shock, followed 
by the official interest rate and then the money market (7) the greater variance in the central bank 
communication is explained by its own shock followed by the official interest rate while the 
money and stock markets explained less than 1% of the variance in the central bank 
communication.  
  
These findings have a number of policy implications. First, the CBN must continue to improve 
on its communication strategy as this has helped reduce inflation and markets volatility, which is 
good for macroeconomic stability. One way that this can be done is for the CBN to more 
effectively align its strategy with those of the FED, BOE and ECB with respect to publishing the 
speeches and presentations of other members of the monetary policy committee. This will make 
the members more visible to the public and will provide the much-needed platform for the public 
to better understand their policy preferences. Second, the CBN governors in their speeches and 
presentations should be talking more about monetary issues as this will help improve perception, 
transparency and credibility of monetary policy. Third, the fact that the response of the money 
market to central bank communication is positive and becomes flat from Q4 implies that this 
market reverts back to equilibrium faster than the stock market where the negative impact 
becomes flat after Q7. This, therefore, suggests that the CBN should focus its monetary policy 
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transmission mechanism more through the interest rate channel than the asset channel. Future 
research on the subject could benefit from more rigorous analysis. For instance, monetary policy 
communications can be related to various parameters and index of communication developed.  
This index might better capture the impact of communication rather than the basic dichotomous 
measure adopted in this study.   
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Appendix A 
Table 1: Speeches/Presentations by Sanusi L. Sanusi btw June 2009 – May 31st 2013 
 
Monetary Policy Related Speeches Economic Related Speeches 
 
Others 
 The Central Bank of Nigeria & Development   Islam and The Culture of Education   
 Nigeria’s Economic Development 
Aspirations and the Leadership Question   
  
 Proposed Currency Restructuring Exercise, 
‘PROJECT CURE’   
 
 The Role of Development Finance 
Institutions in Infrastructure Development   
 
 Increasing Women’s Access To Finance: 
Challenges and Opportunities 
 
 Beyond Political Rhetoric: Investing In 
Youth As An Economic Strategy   
 
 Neither the Washington nor Beijing 
Consensus: Development Models to fit 
African Realities and Cultures    
 
 Banking Reform and Its Impact on the 
Nigerian Economy  
 
  
Banks in Nigeria and National Economic 
Development: A Critical Review   
 
 Global Financial Meltdown and The 
Reforms In Nigerian Banking Sector  
 
 Growth Prospects for The Nigerian 
Economy  
 
 Keynote Address on the 4th Annual Banking 
and Finance Conference 
 
 Consolidating The Gains Of The Banking 
Sector Reforms  
 
 The Nigerian Banking Industry: what went 
wrong and the way forward  
 
 Assessment of Current Development in the 
Nigerian Economy and the CBN Policy 
Action   
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Table 2: Speeches/Presentations by Prof. Soludo (CBN Gov. May 31st 2004 – May 2009) 
 
Monetary Policy Related Speeches 
 
Economic Related Speeches Others 
 The Journey so Far and the Road 
Ahead  
Creating Effective Governance and 
Leadership for Sustained National 
Prosperity  
 Banking in Nigeria at a Time of 
Global Financial Crisis  
 
 Developments in the Banking Sector    
The Challenges of Ensuring 
Appropriate Inflation Rate, 
Exchange Rate, Exchange Rate and 
Interest Rate Regimes in Nigeria  
  
 Global Financial & Economic 
Crisis: How Vulnerable is Nigeria?   
 
Exchange Rate Dynamics    
 Global Financial Meltdown   
 Global Financial Meltdown     
 Creating an Inclusive Economy for 
the Nigerian Woman     
 
 Response to Recent Developments 
in the Banking Industry   
 
Issues on the level of Interest Rates 
in Nigeria    
  
 Financing Imo State towards 
Greatness  
 
 The Unfinished Revolution in the 
Banking System  
 
 Making Finance Working for the 
Poor   
 
 Banks and the National Economy: 
Progress, Challenges and the Road 
Ahead   
 
 Financial System Strategy 2020 
(FSS2020) as the Post Consolidation 
Response  
 
 Towards Vision 2020    
Strategic Agenda for the Naira    
 The Safety and Soundness of the  
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Banking System   
 From a Pariah, Failed State to an 
Emerging Market Economy: The 
Obasanjo Legacy and the Challenges 
Ahead  
 
 Financial System Strategy 2020    
 Preserving Stability and 
Accelerating Growth  
 
 Nigerian Economy: Can We 
Achieve the Vision 20:2020?   
 
Macroeconomic, Monetary and 
Financial Sector Developments  
  
 Financial System Strategy 2020: The 
Next Development Frontier  
 
 Financial Sector Reforms and the 
Real Economy  
 
 Law, Institutions and Nigeria's Quest 
to Join the First World Economy"  
 
Macroeconomy: Progress Report on 
Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy 
and the Financial System  
  
 "Anambra 2030: Envisioning the 
African Dubai and Silicon Valley'  
 
 Update on CBN and Reforms    
 Conclusion of the Acquisition of 
Assets and Assumption of Liabilities 
of Allstates Trust Bank, Plc (in-
liquidation)   
 
State of the Macroeconomy: 
Outlook for Monetary, Banking and 
Exchange Rate Regimes  
  
 Beyond Banking Sector 
consolidation in Nigeria   
 
Programme for Further 
Liberalization of the Foreign 
Exchange Market in Nigeria  
  
 The Next Stage of Reform: 
Institutionalizing Change in Nigeria   
 
 Nigeria: Economic Growth Drivers  
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and Financing Challenges  
 The Outcome of the Banking Sector 
Recapitalization and the Way 
Forward for the Undercapitalized 
Banks  
 
Towards a New Monetary Authority 
and Financial System: Interim 
Progress Report   
  
Towards a Stronger Monetary 
Authority and Financial System  
  
 State and Local Governments to 
Devote 1% of Annual Budget for 
Micro Credit.  
 
 CBN Draws Up Contingency Plan 
For Weak Banks  
 
 "Capital Flows and Economic 
Transformation in Nigeria"  
 
"Developing the Bond Market in 
Nigeria: Challenges & Prospects"  
  
 Promoting Effective and Efficient 
Customer Service Delivery: The 
Role of CBN Branches   
 
 Creating a Continent Wide 
Correspondent Banking Network in 
Africa.  
 
 Consolidating the Nigerian Banking 
Industry to Meet the Development 
Challenges of the 21st Century.  
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Table 3: Speeches/ Presentations by Joseph Sanusi (CBN Gov. May 1999 – May 30th 2004) 
 
 
Monetary Policy Related Speeches 
 
Economic Related Speeches Others 
  Valedictory Speech   
  Key Note Address   
 Welcome Address   
  CBN Governor’s Address    
 Enhancing Efficiency of the 
Payments System in Nigeria  
 
  The Dawn of a New Era in CBN   
  CBN Governor’s Address   
  CBN Governor’s Address  
 Revamping Small and Medium 
Industries    
 
Exchange Rate Mechanism: The 
Current Nigerian Experience   
  
  Cash Handling, Automation and 
Management   
  Keynote Address  
  Enhancing Transparency of 
Financial Services Industry  
Monetary and Financial Policy 
Management  
  
  Financial Sector Stability: Issues and 
Challenges   
  Silver Jubilee Anniversary   
 The Small and Medium Industries 
Equity Investment Scheme and 
Financial Deepening in Nigeria   
 
  Nigeria at 43   
  Multi Disciplinary Cost 
Management Practice: Towards a 
National Economic Resurgence    
Third CBN Annual Monetary Policy 
Conference   
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Banking and Allied Matters for 
Judges   
 Re-inventing Business in Africa: 
From Entrepreneurship to 
Corporation     
 
 Ensuring Banking Soundness and 
Financial Sector Stability  
 
  Welcome Address     
 Welcome Address on Development 
of the Nigerian Financial Markets  
 
Keynote Address       
 Keynote Address     
 Utilization of the SMIEIS Funds: 
The Right Approach   
 
 Developing the Non-oil Sector in 
Nigeria 
 
 Central Bank and the Globalizing 
Forces of the 21st Century  
 
 Progress of Small and Medium 
Industries Equity Investment 
Scheme: The Central Bank of 
Nigeria’s Perspective    
 
  Keynote Address on Regional 
Course on Financial Programming 
and Policies  
On-going Efforts Towards a 
Monetary Union in the West African 
Sub-Region    
  
 Opportunities in Financial Services 
Sector in Nigeria     
 
  The Role of the Financial Sector 
Surveillance Committee of the CBN 
in Anti-Money Laundering, Fraud 
and Other Misuse     
  Keynote Address at the 19th Annual 
Directors Seminar     
  Special Remarks at the National 
Summit on SMIEIS      
 Overview of Governments Efforts in 
the Development of SME’s and the 
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Emergence of Small and Medium 
Industries Equity Investment 
Scheme      
  Keynote Address at the Annual 
Retreat of Association of Corporate 
Managers      
  Central Bank of Nigeria’s 
Standpoint on Anti-Money 
Laundering Compliance      
Management of Nigeria’s Debt     
 Fiscal Policy Management in 
Nigeria    
 
 Opening Address at the Annual 
Conference of Money, 
Macroeconomic Finance and 
Research Group     
 
 Central Bank Authority, Economic 
Stability and the Rule of Law  
 
  Welcome Address at the First 
Stakeholders Annual Dinner of 
Association of Corporate Affairs 
Managers  
  Welcome Address at the Public 
Launching of the Book titled 
‘Nigerian Securities and Exchange 
Commission’  
  Keynote Address at the 
Commissioning of Internet 
Connectivity Project  
 Overview of Recent Economic 
Developments and Investment 
Potentials in Nigeria  
 
 Recent Macroeconomic 
Developments and the Way Forward  
 
  Opening Ceremony of Bond Bank  
Limited 
Monetary, Credit, Foreign Trade and 
Exchange Policy Guidelines for 
2002/2003: Challenges and 
Prospects   
  
 Mortgage Financing in Nigeria: 
Issues and Challenges    
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  Sustainable Rice Production in 
Nigeria 
 Macroeconomic Developments in 
2002 and Assessment of SMIEIS  
 
 Capacity for Economic Management 
in Nigeria: The Role of Tertiary 
Institutions   
 
Keynote Address  at  2nd CBN 
Annual Monetary Policy Conference  
  
  Keynote Address at 4th CBN 
Seminar for Finance Correspondents 
and Business Editors   
  Keynote Address at the Chartered 
Institute of Bankers’ Dinner  
  Keynote Note Speech at Endowment 
Fund Lunching   
  National Seminar on Banking and 
Allied Matters for Judges    
  Keynote Address at 14th Annual 
Banking Conference    
 Achieving Fiscal Sustainability in 
Nigeria   
 
Monetary Policy Forum and 
Implementation: Nigerian 
Experience    
  
The State of the Nigerian Economy 
with particular reference to 
Exchange Rate and Reserve 
Management    
  
  The New Capital Accord   
Central Bank and the 
Macroeconomic Environment in 
Nigeria   
  
  Opening Remarks at the First 
Annual Capital Market Conference 
  Opening Remarks at the Nigerian 
Capital Market and Globalization 
Challenge     
 Savings Management in Developing 
Countries     
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Nigeria’s Macroeconomic Position: 
Controlling Money Supply   
  
Current Challenges of Monetary 
Policy in Nigeria    
  
 Macroeconomic Developments in 
the First Five Months of 2002    
 
 Repositioning the Nigerian Financial 
Markets for Competitiveness in the 
21st Century    
 
 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: A 
CBN Perspective    
 
 The Importance of Financial 
Intermediation In Sustaining 
Economic Growth and 
Development: The Banking Sector 
Review    
 
 
 
 
  Promoting Good Corporate 
Governance: Issues and Challenges 
International Monetary and 
Financial Affairs and Development  
  
Welcome Address at the 5th 
Monetary Policy Forum  
  
 Welcome Address at the FGN 2002 
Budget Seminar     
 
  Welcome Address at the Bankers’ 
Committee Forum      
  Governor’s First Briefing  
Source: Compiled from CBN Website 
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Appendix B 
 
Figure 1: Inflation volatility under the CBN Governors 
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    Source: Authors  
 
 
Figure 2: Volatility of the NIBOR Rate under the CBN Governors   
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Figure 3: Volatility of the All Share Index under the CBN Governors   
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     Source: Authors 
Table 1: Unit root test  
 
 ADF Test at level ADF Test at first diff 
 ADF test statistic p-value ADF test statistic p-value 
MRRMPR -2.792045 0.0626 -8.542120 0.0000 
NIBOR -3.204802 0.0223 -7.326684 0.0000 
ASI -1.937105 0.3144 -5.706147 0.0000 
    
 
Table 2: VAR system, maximum lag order 2 
 
lags Loglik P(LR) AIC BIC HQC 
1 392.8672  -6.7794* -6.2884* -6.5802* 
2 405.2792 0.0729 -6.7141 -5.8303 -6.3556 
  
 
Table 3: Johansen Co-integration Test 
 
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test                 p-value         Lmax test   p-value 
0 0.3995 135.7300 0.0000 56.6150 0.0000 
1 0.3232           79.1110 0.0000 43.3300 0.0000 
2 0.2750           35.7810                     0.0000 35.7000 0.0000 
3 0.0007 0.0812                  0.7757              0.0811 0.7757 
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Appendix C 
 
Figure 1: Response of NIBOR to shock to MRRMPR 
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Figure 2: Response of NIBOR to shock to Communications 
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Figure 3: Response of ASI to shock to MRRMPR 
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Figure 4: Response of ASI to shock to Communication  
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Table 1: Decomposition of variance for MRRMPR 
 
 Period MRRMPR NIBOR ASI COMM 
1 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2 98.6631  0.1806 0.9577 0.1986 
3 97.0833  0.1963 2.2243 0.4960 
4 95.4897  0.1949 3.5004 0.8150 
5 93.9249 0.2079 4.7349 1.1323 
6 92.4037  0.2295 5.9252 1.4416 
7 90.9299      0.2544      7.0743      1.7415 
8 89.5031      0.2799      8.1852      2.0318 
9 88.1219      0.3051      9.2600      2.3129 
10 86.7843      0.3297     10.3008      2.5852 
11 85.4884      0.3536     11.3091      2.8489 
12 84.2321  0.3768 12.2864 3.1046 
13 83.0139     0.3993 13.2343 3.3525 
14 81.8319      0.4212     14.1539      3.5931 
15 80.6846      0.4423     15.0465      3.8266 
16 79.5704      0.4629     15.9133      4.0534 
17 78.4880      0.4829     16.7554      4.2737 
18 77.4360      0.5024     17.5739      4.4878 
19 76.4131 0.5213 18.3697 4.6960 
20 75.4182   0.5396 19.1437 4.8985 
Average 86.7740  0.3340  10.2975  2.5945  
    Source: Authors estimations 
 
 
 
Table 2: Decomposition of variance for NIBOR 
 
    Period MRRMPR NIBOR ASI COMM 
1 22.8831 77.1169 0.0000 0.0000 
2 21.7857 78.0325 0.0282 0.1535 
3 21.5182 77.9660 0.1034 0.4123 
4 21.3954 77.6849 0.2069 0.7128 
5 21.2948 77.3569 0.3222 1.0262 
6 21.1980 77.0185 0.4414 1.3422 
7 21.1025 76.6790 0.5613 1.6572 
8 21.0080 76.3412 0.6808 1.9701 
9 20.9143 76.0059 0.7994 2.2804 
10 20.8214 75.6734 0.9171 2.5880 
11 20.7294 75.3439 1.0338 2.8930 
12 20.6382 75.0172 1.1494 3.1952 
13 20.5478 74.6933 1.2641 3.4948 
14 20.4581 74.3723 1.3777 3.7918 
15 20.3693 74.0541 1.4904 4.0863 
16 20.2812 73.7386 1.6020 4.3781 
17 20.1939 73.4259 1.7128 4.6675 
18 20.1073 73.1158 1.8225 4.9543 
19 20.0215 72.8084 1.9313 5.2387 
20 19.9364 72.5036 2.0392 5.5207 
Average 20.8602 75.4474 0.9741 2.7181 
   Source: Authors estimations 
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Table 3: Decomposition of variance for ASI 
 
Period MRRMPR NIBOR ASI COMM 
1 1.8651 1.2363 96.8986 0.0000 
2 2.2263 0.8817 96.8907 0.0014 
3 2.3416 1.1736 96.4819 0.0029 
4 2.3830 1.4700 96.1430 0.0040 
5 2.4010 1.6939 95.9003 0.0048 
6 2.4105 1.8573 95.7269 0.0053 
7 2.4166 1.9784 95.5993 0.0057 
8 2.4209 2.0706 95.5025 0.0060 
9 2.4241 2.1428 95.4268 0.0063 
10 2.4267 2.2008 95.3661 0.0065 
11 2.4288 2.2483 95.3163 0.0066 
12 2.4305 2.2879 95.2748 0.0068 
13 2.4320 2.3214 95.2397 0.0069 
14 2.4333 2.3502 95.2095 0.0070 
15 2.4344 2.3752 95.1834 0.0071 
16 2.4354 2.3970 95.1605 0.0071 
17 2.4362 2.4163 95.1403 0.0072 
18 2.4370 2.4334 95.1223 0.0073 
19 2.4376 2.4488 95.1063 0.0073 
20 2.4383 2.4626 95.0918 0.0074 
Average 2.3829 
   
 
2.0223 95.5890 0.0056 
 Source: Authors estimations 
 
Table 4: Decomposition of variance for COMM 
 
Period MRRMPR NIBOR ASI COMM 
1 0.6155 0.0279 0.0811 99.2755 
2 0.8412 0.0399 0.0883 99.0306 
3 0.9556 0.0496 0.0914 98.9034 
4 1.0200 0.0565 0.0929 98.8306 
5 1.0600 0.0613 0.0938 98.7849 
6 1.0871 0.0647 0.0943 98.7539 
7 1.1064 0.0672 0.0947 98.7316 
8 1.1210 0.0691 0.0950 98.7149 
9 1.1323 0.0706 0.0953 98.7018 
10 1.1414 0.0718 0.0954 98.6914 
11 1.1488 0.0728 0.0956 98.6829 
12 1.1550 0.0736 0.0957 98.6757 
13 1.1602 0.0743 0.0958 98.6697 
14 1.1647 0.0748 0.0959 98.6646 
15 1.1686 0.0754 0.0960 98.6601 
16 1.1720 0.0758 0.0961 98.6562 
17 1.1750 0.0762 0.0961 98.6527 
18 1.1776 0.0765 0.0962 98.6497 
19 1.1800 0.0769 0.0962 98.6469 
20 1.1822 0.0771 0.0963 98.6444 
Average 1.0882 0.0666 0.0941 98.7511  
  Source: Authors estimations  
